Li, Xueheng, Lucas Molleman, and Dennie van Dolder. “Do descriptive social norms drive peer punishment? Conditional punishment strategies and their impact on cooperation.” Evolution and Human Behavior (2021).

Working Papers

Designing Weighted and Directed Networks under Complementarities (2020). R&R on Games and Economic Behavior. Available at SSRN:

Whether to pursue aggregate efficiency or trade off efficiency for equality, optimizing a network of complementarities leads to a hierarchy among agents. Formally, all optimal networks under complementarities are generalized nested split graphs, in which agents are ordered by `link-dominance’.

Resentment and the Evolution of Social Norms Governing Cooperation (January 2020). Available at SSRN:

If people disapprove and punish behaviors that violate common social practices and are harmful to others, then cooperation can be sustained as a self-fulfilling social norm. This assumption leads to long-run dynamics of cooperation and punishment consistent with recent cross-cultural and experimental findings that are difficult to explain by standard evolutionary models of cooperation.

Work in Progress

Lying and Naivety in Multi-player Cheap Talk, with Daniele Nosenzo.

When several senders talk simultaneously to a receiver, lying costs change truth-telling between senders from strategic substitutes to strategic complements. Also, because of the receiver’s naivety, the lies of a sender affect the lies of another sender.

The Market for Lemons and Liars, with Valeria Burdea.

Can intrinsic preferences for truth-telling solve the problem of adverse selection? No, because there is self-selection: people with different preferences for truth-telling participate in markets with different information disclosure rules. The self-selection leads to bad market outcomes as if all individuals are material payoff maximizers.